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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department 
of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Panel 12. Revitalizing the Ship Design and 
Shipbuilding Process 
Wednesday, May 16, 2012  
3:30 p.m. – 
5:00 p.m. 
Chair: Robert “Bob” G. Keane Jr., President, Ship Design USA, Inc. 
International Naval Technology Transfer: Lessons Learned from the Spanish 
and Chilean Shipbuilding Experience 
Larrie Ferreiro, Defense Acquisition University 
Total Ship Design Process Modeling 
David A. Helgerson, CSC Advanced Marine Center 
Seth Cooper, NAVSEA05C 
Gilbert Goddin, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren 
Gene Allen, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division 
Daniel Billingsley, Grey Ghost, LLC 
Sean Gallagher, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division 
Revitalization of Naval Surface Warfare Center Excellence in Early Stage 
Combat System Engineering 
Ashby Hall, Terence Sheehan, and Mark Williams 
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren 
Robert “Bob” G. Keane Jr.—Mr. Keane is the president of Ship Design USA, Inc. Prior to starting 
his own consulting firm, Mr. Keane worked at the Advanced Marine Center of CSC and at the Naval 
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) for 35 years. Mr. Keane was a member of the Senior Executive 
Service (SES) for 21 years. He last served as executive director of the Surface Ship Design and 
Systems Engineering Group in NAVSEA. He also served as director of the Total Ship Systems 
Directorate (Code 20) at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division (NSWCCD). Mr. 
Keane previously held senior leadership positions in NAVSEA as chief naval architect and deputy 
director, Surface Ship Design and Systems Engineering Group; technical director, Ship Design 
Group; director, Ship Survivability Sub-Group; director, Naval Architecture Sub-Group; director, Hull 
Form Design, Stability and Hydrodynamics Division; head, Hull Equipment Branch; and as a ship 
arrangements design specialist. 
Mr. Keane is widely recognized as an expert in naval ship design, is a plank holder in the Navy’s 
Center for Innovation in Ship Design at NSWCCD, and has fostered the professional development of 
engineers and scientists in government and industry. He received his Bachelor of Engineering 
Science in mechanical engineering from Johns Hopkins University, his Master of Science in 
Engineering in ship hydrodynamics from Stevens Institute of Technology, and his Master of Science 
in Engineering in naval architecture and marine engineering from the University of Michigan. 
Mr. Keane is currently serving as chair of the American Society of Naval Engineers (ASNE) and 
Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (SNAME) Joint Ship Design Committee, as a 
member of the ASNE-SNAME Joint Education Committee, as a member of the SNAME Technical & 
Research Steering Committee, and ex-officio member of the ASNE-SNAME Strategic Alliance 
Committee and he is a current member of the ASNE National Council. He recently served as chair of 
the highly successful ASNE-SNAME International Electric Ship Design Symposium (ESDS) in 
February 2009, and has served as chair of the ASNE Flagship Section, chair of the SNAME 
Chesapeake Section, president of the Association of Scientists and Engineers (ASE) of NAVSEA, 
regional vice president of SNAME, and president of the D.C. Council of Engineering and Architectural 
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Societies. He has held numerous other leadership positions in these societies, and has published 
frequently in the Naval Engineers Journal and Journal of Ship Production. 
Mr. Keane has received many honorary awards including the Secretary of the Navy Distinguished 
Civilian Service Award, Department of the Navy Superior and Meritorious Civilian Service Awards, 
SNAME David W. Taylor Medal, ASE Silver Medal, ASE Professional Achievement Award, SNAME 
Distinguished Service Award, two SNAME Elmer Hann Awards for Best Paper, ASE John Niedermair 
Award for Best Paper, and election as a Fellow of SNAME. Mr. Keane and his wife, Judy, have three 
sons and four grandchildren. [keanerg@comcast.net] 
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International Naval Technology Transfer: Lessons Learned 
from the Spanish and Chilean Shipbuilding Experience 
Larrie Ferreiro—Dr. Ferreiro is the director of research at the Defense Acquisition University, and 
executive editor of the Defense Acquisition Research Journal. He has been a naval architect in the 
U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, the French Navy, and the British Navy. He is a professor of complex 
systems engineering at the Catholic University in Washington, DC, and at George Mason University 
in Fairfax, VA. He is the author and editor of several award-winning books, notably Ships and 
Science, about the history of naval architecture; Measure of the Earth, about an 18th-century scientific 
expedition to the equator, and Technology of the Ships of Trafalgar, about the vessels that fought in 
the most important naval battle of modern history. 
Abstract 
In 2007 the Spanish shipbuilder Navantia won the contract to rebuild the Australian navy with 
high-end destroyers and amphibious ships. The same year, the Chilean shipyard ASMAR 
won the contract to build an advanced Icelandic Coast Guard Vessel. Both shipyards just a 
few years before had been importing design and construction technologies from abroad; now 
in a rapid evolution of capability, they had become net technology exporters. A similar 
process had occurred at the turn of the 20th century, when United States and Japan rapidly 
built up their own shipbuilding capabilities using knowledge primarily derived from British 
shipbuilders, who at the time were known as “naval architects to the world.” This paper uses 
the examples of Spain and Chile to demonstrate how modern naval shipbuilders can rapidly 
evolve from net importers of technology to net exporters with the assistance of foreign 
technology transfer, and lays out the systematic way this process may occur. It then derives 
lessons for other navies (including the U.S. Navy) as they rebuild their fleets to meet new 
global missions in the face of dwindling resources. 
Introduction 
On June 20, 2007, the Spanish shipbuilder Navantia made a clean sweep of the 
global competition to rebuild much of the Australian Navy, landing a total of $11 billion in 
contracts for three Air Warfare Destroyers and a pair of amphibious ships on the same day 
(Uhlmann, 2007). Coming on the heels of a major export contract to Norway (five air-
defense destroyers) and one to Thailand (an aircraft carrier), this was a wake-up call to the 
world’s naval industries: Spain, which just 20 years earlier was still importing design and 
construction expertise, was now not only equipping its own navy with advanced destroyers, 
amphibious ships, and aircraft carriers; it had become shipbuilder to the world for these 
same high-value warships. In the same year, the Chilean shipbuilder ASMAR (Astilleros y 
Maestranzas de la Armada) began construction of an advanced Icelandic Coast Guard 
Vessel, after winning the contract in the face of stiff competition worldwide (“ASMAR 
Construirá Patrullero,” 2006). ASMAR had recently won export contracts for building 
complex vessels, such as an Icelandic oceanographic research ship and a patrol ship for 
Mauritius, after decades of repair work and the occasional fishing vessel; so on a smaller 
scale, Chile, while building up its own naval fleet with new offshore patrol ships, was now 
also following in Spain’s footsteps, constructing complex military vessels for the world 
market. 
What is happening today in Spain and Chile echoes the process of technology 
transfer that occurred in nations such as the United States and Japan that were building and 
rebuilding their navies during the late 19th and early 20th centuries: first, import of 
engineering expertise, often beginning with direct purchase of ships built in a foreign yard; 
next, accumulation of experience by designing and building vessels locally under a license 
or government agreement from a foreign shipyard; and finally, the creation and construction 
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of indigenous warships to meet navy requirements. The difference between Japan and the 
United States of yesteryear, and Spain and Chile of today, is that while the former navies 
used that expertise almost exclusively to build up their own fleets, the latter have rapidly 
expanded their capabilities beyond their own navies and into the growing naval export 
market. In other words, both Spain and Chile have gone from being a net technology 
importer to a net exporter of naval shipbuilding technology and expertise in almost the blink 
of an eye. The purpose of this paper is to chart this rapid progress, and to derive lessons for 
other navies (including the U.S. Navy) as they rebuild their fleets to meet new global 
missions in the face of dwindling resources. 
International Technology Transfer in the Naval Industries: The Historical 
Context 
Long before the word globalization entered the modern lexicon, shipbuilding was a 
global enterprise. At the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, for example, the Spanish flagship 
Santísima Trinidad was designed by a constructor of Irish descent, Matthew Mullan, and 
built by other English-speaking artisans who themselves had been recruited from British 
shipyards. Other Spanish ships at Trafalgar were actually designed by a French constructor, 
François Gautier, who had been recruited to harmonize the allied fleets of France and 
Spain. Both France and Spain made extensive use of copper sheathing to protect their 
ships, a technology originally developed in Britain but rapidly extended into other countries 
through both industrial agreements and espionage. Finally, more than half of Britain’s fleet 
at Trafalgar consisted of 74-gun ships that owed their design to captured French warships 
(Ferreiro, 2007). 
Technology transfer was the critical feature in the rapid expansion of the Industrial 
Revolution around the globe during the 19th century. This was nowhere more evident than in 
ship design and construction, and in particular the experience of British shipbuilders. The 
two critical technologies of the period—metal hulls (first iron, then steel) and steam 
propulsion—originated in Great Britain, but were quickly adopted almost everywhere. British 
constructors were known as “the naval architects of the world,” both for building vessels for 
other countries, as well as for teaching other nations how to do so (Matsumoto, 1999, p. 76). 
Then, as now, economics governed the majority of technology transfer cases, with both 
sides expecting a reasonable profit at minimal risk. British ships dominated world trade, and 
both ship-owners and shipbuilders from many maritime nations, rather than attempting to 
compete toe-to-toe with indigenous technology, chose to buy or build British vessels. A 
common pattern emerged during the late 1800s: a British shipyard would at first sell its ships 
to a foreign ship-owner or shipyard. These sales were followed by industrial visits to the 
British yard by foreign dignitaries and engineers alike, often leading to commercial 
agreements in which British designs, materials, and often workers were directly imported 
into a foreign shipyard; in some cases these workers came on a temporary basis, in others 
as permanent expatriates. The foreign shipyard would work closely with the British 
engineers to introduce the latest innovations, at the same time gradually substituting their 
local expertise, material, and labor. British shipbuilders, with full order-books, did not view 
this as harmful competition, but rather saw increased profits via direct sales of ships and 
materiel, as well as licensing fees (Ville, 1991). This pattern of technology transfer was even 
more prevalent in the naval industries, that is, the design and construction of warship hulls 
and machinery, where both political considerations and profit played equal roles. Two 
examples stand out: the reconstruction of the U.S. Navy post–Civil War, from 1880–1900, 
and the buildup of the Japanese Navy from 1865–1912. These will serve as a backdrop to 
the more recent experience of the Spanish and Chilean Navies. 
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After the Civil War the U.S. Navy scrapped or sold most of its warships, so that by 
1880 it had effectively been reduced to a coastwise fleet. In terms of numbers and 
capabilities, it fell behind all European powers and even navies of South America. From 
1881–1883 the Navy and Congress put together a plan to rebuild its capabilities, beginning 
with a set of steel vessels called the ABCD ships for their names Atlanta, Boston, Chicago 
(all cruisers), and the dispatch vessel Dolphin. By this time several U.S. naval officers had 
graduated from the constructors’ course at the Britain’s Royal Naval College in Greenwich, 
and were intimately familiar with the design and construction of British warships. The U.S. 
Navy bought the plans and specifications for the Leander-class protected cruisers and 
closely hewed to them when designing the ABC cruisers. The contracts were let to the John 
Roach shipyard in Delaware, who initially bought compound engines from the British firm 
Randolph and Elder before producing his own under license. During the 1880s and 1890s, 
the U.S. Navy spent many thousands of dollars to obtain plans and specifications for other 
British cruisers and engines, and to send its naval officers to be trained at the Royal Naval 
College. However, it did not import British constructors or engineers to work at U.S. facilities. 
By 1900, the Navy had developed its own ship model testing facilities at the Washington 
Navy Yard, based on Britain’s Haslar tank, and its own naval constructor’s course at MIT 
that closely hewed to the Greenwich model (Bennett, 1896, pp. 773–794; Thiesen, 1999; 
Ville, 1991, p. 79). 
Japan’s Meji Restoration saw enormous technological changes as the country 
clawed its way from the 16th century all the way to the 20th in just a few years. Shipbuilding 
was one of the most important industries to be literally built from the ground up, starting with 
naval constructors from France (notably François Léonce Verny and Emile Bertin) who from 
1865–1885 created Japan’s first modern warship fleet (Dedet, 1993). By the mid-1880s, 
however, Japan firmly fixed its sights on the British model. In particular, the Mitsubishi 
Nagasaki shipyard carefully crafted a long-term strategy to import naval technologies from 
the UK. In addition to sending engineers overseas to learn at British schools and factories, it 
recruited a number of skilled workers on both short-term and long-term contracts, who were 
placed in charge of key facilities. However, as their Japanese subordinates gained skill and 
experience, they gradually took over these positions. Mitsubishi imported plans, materiel, 
and machinery for designing, testing, and constructing ships and equipment; for example, 
steam turbines were imported from the Charles Parsons Company in 1907, until the yard 
was able to build a turbine manufacturing facility under license. In 1907–1908 it also 
imported materiel and know-how to create its own testing tank. By the eve of the First World 
War, just two generations after it had begun from scratch, Japan had a well-developed, 
autonomous capability to design, test, and construct its own warships (Fukasaku, 1992, 
1995; Matsumoto, 1999; Matsumoto & Sinclair, 1994). 
Military technology transfer must always be regarded in the wider political and 
economic frameworks, and the cases discussed in this paper are no different (Anthony, 
1990). In the above examples of the United States and Japan, the principal goal of the 
receiving nation was to build or rebuild its fleet; the development of a shipbuilding export 
capability was a minor or nonexistent consideration on the national scale, and few of the 
commercial shipyards built warships for export. In the following cases of Spain and Chile, 
the goal of creating a warship export capability will be seen as integral to the political and 
economic policies of sustaining the national naval infrastructure. 
Evolution of Technology Transfer in Spanish Naval Shipbuilding, 1890–2010 
Throughout the 19th century, Spain’s warships were either bought directly from other 
nations (primarily Britain and to a lesser extent France), or constructed in the three 
government-owned naval shipyards of El Ferrol, La Carraca (in Cádiz), and Cartagena. In 
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1887 the Squadron Law authorized the construction of a new generation of modern 
warships, and allowed a consortium of British and Spanish firms to form a private company, 
Astilleros del Nervión in Bilbao, for the express purpose of constructing some of them. In the 
manner of the Spanish yards at the time of Trafalgar, Astilleros del Nervión had a mixture of 
Spanish and British technical personnel, though it was the latter who were in overall charge. 
Three Infanta María Teresa–class cruisers, basically an enlarged version of the British 
Orlando class, were laid down in 1889 and completed four years later, not much longer than 
British yards required. That capability did not transfer to the government yards, for three 
similar cruisers laid down in those yards at the same time were still not complete a decade 
later in time for the Spanish–American War (1898), which ravaged the Spanish fleet and 
eliminated its last remaining colonies.  
In 1909, after an extensive international competition, the Sociedad Española de 
Construcción Naval (SECN), known as “La Naval,” was created by a consortium of British 
shipyards (Vickers, Armstrong, and John Brown) to rebuild the fleet to Spain’s new needs. 
According to the terms of the contract, they leased the facilities of the three government 
shipyards, in effect privatizing their operations, and extensively modernized them. Over the 
course of 20 years the SECN built numerous warships generally based on British designs 
(e.g., the España class was a reduced Dreadnought). Once again, the British were 
unquestionably in charge of the operation; most of the design and manufacturing expertise, 
as well as all of the senior personnel, came from Britain (large expatriate communities grew 
up around the shipyards, including a British School at El Ferrol). The downside of this 
arrangement was that very little of that technical expertise was transferred to Spanish 
engineers and shipbuilders (Houpt & Ortiz-Villajos, 1988; Lozano Courtier, 1997; Ramírez 
Gabarrús, 1980). 
These privatized yards had mixed success in jump-starting the Spanish shipbuilding 
industry and aiding its shipping sector. Although equipment manufacture (e.g., turbine and 
diesel engines, electrical systems) rapidly spread into the merchant shipbuilding sector, the 
overreliance on British technical support—even shipbuilding steel came from Britain—
crippled any real innovation. Spain’s dependence on foreign sources for science and 
engineering was widely rationalized with a quote from the Spanish writer Miguel de 
Unamuno: ¡Que inventen ellos! Let others (i.e., foreigners) invent it! (Unamuno, 2007, p. 
296). The phrase gained wide currency, a self-portrayal of the Spanish as somehow lacking 
the scientific acumen of other (European) nations, and being merely passive adopters of 
new technologies. 
The events of the next few decades seemed to reinforce this negative image of 
Spanish technical expertise. In 1939, at the end of the Spanish Civil war and the beginning 
of both World War II and Francisco Franco’s regime, the SECN was reorganized out of the 
warship business, with the three shipyards restored to government control as British workers 
returned home to a nation newly at war. Without British help, naval shipbuilding limped 
along under the Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI, a government-owned holding company) 
and its subsidiary Empresa Nacional Bazán de Construcciones Navales Militares (Bazán, 
the newly-nationalized consortium of the three government shipyards); only a handful of 
small warships—mostly outdated destroyers and minesweepers, and no capital ships—were 
constructed during World War II and the years immediately following (Alvarez-Maldonado 
Muela, 1997, pp. 37–43; Molas-Gallart, 1995, pp. 46–47). Instead, Spain turned to Germany 
for technical assistance and technology transfer in submarine construction, both during the 
war and afterwards. This arrangement was driven principally by national political 
considerations, because Spain shared a “special relationship” with Germany through much 
of World War II, and was generally ostracized by other nations afterwards because of that 
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relationship. This arrangement, however, was largely unsuccessful at the technical level, 
due to the fact that Spanish shipyards balked at the obsolete designs being offered by 
Germany, and German engineers who came to Madrid found Spanish technical and 
managerial capabilities to be sorely lacking (Presas i Puig, 2005, 2007, 2008). 
This all changed in 1953, when Cold War realities pushed aside prior political 
considerations, and resulted in the signature of the Pact of Madrid by Spain and the USA. 
Among other things, the Pact provided for mutual defense, for U.S. military aid to Spain, and 
for the construction of bases in Spain that could be used by the USA (notably Rota). The 
advantages for Spain were clear: its navy was in a sorry state, with capital ships over 30 
years old; even its most modern vessels were based on outdated designs. For the USA, it 
meant having an allied navy to lend a hand against the newly-ascendant Soviet Union, 
strong in minesweeping and antisubmarine warfare (ASW), which could bolster the eastern 
Atlantic and Mediterranean approaches. Over the next decade the United States transferred 
26 ASW destroyers and minesweepers, transferred over $42 million (worth about $340 
million in 2012 dollars) to modernize equipment on 40 other ships, for example, guns, fire 
control, and so forth, mostly using American gear, and provided extensive training for 
officers and the sailors (Whitaker, 1961). 
For its next upgrade, Spain originally intended to build British Leander class frigates, 
but political complications between the two nations ended that effort. In November 1964 the 
Spanish Ministry of Defense approved the construction of guided-missile ships to be built 
under U.S. license at the Bazán El Ferrol shipyard. In May 1966 the support agreement, 
NOBS 4078, was signed between the two countries for what became known as the DEG7 
Baleares class, based on the DE1052 Knox class ASW destroyer, but modified to have an 
anti-air warfare (AAW) missile system in place of helicopter facilities. The U.S. Navy 
established a small Resident Shipbuilding Liaison Office (RESHIPLO) on-site at El Ferrol, 
headed by a U.S. Navy commander, to administer the day-to-day workings of the support 
agreement (Alvarez-Maldonado Muela, 1997, pp. 106–107; Blackman, 1970, p. 272; 
Fernandez Gonzalez, 2009; Luengo-Romero, 2009; Ramírez Gabarrús, 1980, pp. 192–195; 
Saylor, 2009). The Baleares project proved to be a turning point in Spain’s ability to build 
modern warships. 
The Bazán approach to technology transfer was completely unlike the pattern 
established at the SECN in the 1920s and 1930s, where the majority of the technical 
expertise came in the form of foreign personnel. Instead, it resembled more the Mitsubishi 
strategy which specifically emphasized the gradual development of home-grown skills. The 
first task was to define what was already available, and what was still needed, to construct 
such advanced warships in the El Ferrol yard. To do this, the RESHIPLO assisted Bazán in 
obtaining licenses for the design and construction of the ship and major equipment, and 
bringing representatives of the various U.S. industries. Bazán by then was building large 
tankers (up to 75,000 deadweight tonnes) for the international market, so they had excellent 
steel fabrication facilities. However, they lacked adequate capability to fabricate large 
aluminum plates for the DEG7 deckhouse, and needed additional facilities for weapon 
systems integration and to machine the high-speed reduction gears. Bazán invested some 
500 million pesetas (equivalent to $48 million in 2012 dollars) to upgrade its facilities, as well 
as developing a complete training system for its technical personnel. For example, U.S. 
Navy personnel oversaw the establishment of a welding school to teach the specific 
techniques needed to weld the comparatively thin plates and close frames for warship; but 
this was a “train-the–trainers” arrangement, where a handful of Americans taught the 
welding techniques to senior shipyard welders, who then trained other workers. 
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The U.S. Navy hired the design firm Gibbs & Cox Inc. (G&C) as ship design agents 
for the DEG7 hull and machinery, and Sperry for the combat systems. G&C long had a 
special relationship with the U.S. Navy as its preferred design agent (i.e., it provided the 
designs that shipyards would then build), and it was at the time handling the detailed design 
work for the DE1052 class. G&C redesigned the ship to accommodate the Spanish 
requirements, at the same time translating the plans into metric units (and into Spanish). 
Sperry established a training and integration facility in New York for the combat systems, 
which trained Spanish personnel at the same site where the combat systems were 
integrated and tested, before those systems were disassembled and shipped to Spain. 
Other engineers were sent for training to U.S. shipyards and factories where the DE1052 
and its components were constructed. In 1969 the RESHIPLO was moved back to the 
Washington, DC, region to manage the contracts, but there were now over 100 U.S. 
personnel from various companies (e.g., G&C, Sperry, Foster-Wheeler for the propulsion 
machinery, etc.) on-site at El Ferrol, mainly devoted to quality assurance which was still not 
up to U.S. standards. 
Work progressed slowly as the Bazán personnel developed the skills, techniques, 
and quality control practices required to construct advanced warships. Most of this 
knowledge transfer took place with the production personnel (welders, shipfitters, 
machinists, etc.); by contrast, the design and engineering personnel were much less 
involved in the process, as those tasks were primarily left to G&C. By 1976, Bazán had 
successfully delivered 5 ships (now redesignated as frigates, the F70 class), which played 
an important role in the NATO naval force structure when Spain entered the organization in 
1982. 
The Baleares program was part of a larger agenda of industrial internationalization 
begun in the 1960s by the Spanish government, which included building Delfin class 
submarines and AMX 30 tanks under license from France, João Coutinho class corvettes 
(for Portugal) in cooperation with the German shipyard Blohm und Voss, and F-5 fighters 
under license from the USA, all with the express purpose of ramping up manufacturing 
capability and training the production work force (Castillo Masete, 1990, p. 118; Molas-
Gallart, 1990, pp. 353–354). After the death of Franco in 1975, a new Ministry of Defense 
was created, which merged the formerly separate ministries of Navy, Army, and Air Force. 
Within the new MoD, an organization called DGAM (Dirección General de Armamento y 
Material), modeled upon the highly centralized French Délégation Géneral pour l’Armement, 
was created to coordinate armament procurement and budgeting, allowing for the creation 
of a uniform defense industrial policy (Molas-Gallart, 1995, pp. 95–96; Ramírez Gabarrús, 
1980). 
One of the first coordinated procurements, which actually had its roots in the creation 
of DGAM, was the combination of AV-8 Harrier VSTOL fighters (designated Matador in 
Spain) with a new-generation aircraft carrier. The Spanish Navy had many difficulties 
operating a small group of AV-8s from the antiquated (WWII-era) carrier Dédalo, and 
decided it needed a new carrier expressly built for this purpose. At the same time, the U.S. 
Navy was considering building a fleet of small ASW carriers, designated the Sea Control 
Ship (SCS) that carried AV-8s and helicopters, to work in conjunction with the FFG7 Perry-
class ASW frigates then in development. The Spanish Navy saw the SCS as a potential 
replacement for Dédalo, and in 1973 under the NOBS 4078 agreement, pursued a joint 
program with the U.S. Navy to design and construct the carrier. However, in 1974 the U.S. 
Congress refused to fund the SCS, effectively killing the U.S. participation, though the 
Spanish continued to study the concept (also briefly examining a French helicopter carrier, 
the PH75) and develop a proposal for a new carrier. In 1977 Spain formally approved 
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construction of the small carrier (initially designated the PA11, it became the R11 Principe 
de Asturias), in conjunction with the construction of three (eventually six) Perry-class frigates 
(known as the F81 Santa María-class), both designed and built under license from the USA. 
Once again, the U.S. design agent Gibbs & Cox Inc. was to be the critical intermediary in 
the transfer of technical knowledge (Blackman, 1970, pp. 496, 498; Fernandez Gonzalez, 
2009; Luengo-Romero, 2009; Molas-Gallart, 1995, p. 125; Ramírez Gabarrús, 1980, pp. 
221–226; Saylor, 2009). 
The already well-established working relationship between G&C and Bazán greatly 
facilitated the ramp-up for the two new programs. The SCS project had initially been 
designed by the U.S. Navy’s technical bureau NAVSHIPS (Naval Ship Systems Command), 
but the 50-odd concept drawings were completed by G&C. Under NOBS 4078, G&C (in 
close cooperation with Bazán engineers) created the 1,667 detailed design drawings and 
complete technical specifications needed to construct the vessel. The R11 had several 
notable modifications from the original SCS. First, it was fitted with a ski-jump to provide a 
launch boost for the VSTOL fighters, a concept originally invented by the British Navy but at 
the time not yet operational on its carriers Invincible or Hermes, so its inclusion was a bit of 
a leap of faith. Second, the vessel’s military capabilities in terms of shock resistance, 
magnetic signature, and damage control were improved over the original design. Finally, the 
Spanish Navy selected the indigenous close-in-weapon system Meroka over the American 
Vulcan/Phalanx, which had to be integrated into the combat system. Spanish engineers 
worked closely with G&C and Sperry during the entire design and construction, learning 
valuable lessons on how to carry out and manage the overall process. After keel-laying in 
1979, the hull construction took a reasonable 31 months until launch; but installation of 
propulsion and combat systems was agonizingly slow due to numerous design 
modifications, so that the vessel was delivered, not as planned in 1983, but rather in 1988, 
eleven years after keel-laying. 
The F81 frigate program was approved in the same 1977 budget authorization as the 
aircraft carrier, though the resources needed for the carrier design and construction briefly 
interrupted the otherwise steady flow of design and construction. The first of class, Santa 
María, was laid down in 1982 and completed in four years; the sixth ship took just two years 
from keel-laying to commissioning. The frigates and the carrier both had gas-turbine 
propulsion plants, a technological leap from the steam plant of the F70. Bazán built several 
elements under license (e.g., the turbine enclosures and the reduction gear housing) which 
further advanced the state of the industry. As with the R11, Spanish engineers participated 
in the detailed design and construction, including integrating the weapons systems into the 
platform. G&C was heavily involved not merely in the design of the ships, but also in the 
formation of the Spanish engineers’ training and skill development, including structural 
design, shock resistance, weight control, stability and hydrodynamics. At the height of the 
collaboration in the mid-1980s, almost half of G&C was in some way working on the two 
Spanish Navy programs. 
It should be noted that both shipbuilding programs were actually just a small subset 
of a much wider effort by Spain during the 1980s to boost its military-industrial capability 
through foreign technology transfer, via industrial offsets and licensed production. The 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contracts for the frigates amounted to $227 million, while for 
the carrier it was $165 million. By contrast, the ASW helicopters and systems for the frigates 
were $230 million, while the Matadors for the carrier were $369 million; and even these 
paled in comparison to the F-18 fighter contracts, worth over $2.5 billion, each helping to 
develop a particular, strategically important niche of Spanish industry (JUSMAAG, 1987). 
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With the completion of these three programs—F70, F81, and R11—the Spanish 
naval shipbuilding industry had rapidly learned how to create detailed designs, manufacture 
components such as hull and machinery, and integrate complex systems. The final step 
towards technological self-sufficiency was the ability to autonomously create complete, 
integrated designs starting with customer requirements. Although the first steps had been 
taken in the 1970s with the Descubierta-class corvettes, a significant leap in capability was 
made with Spain’s participation in the NATO Naval Frigate Replacement 1990 (NFR90) 
program. NFR90 was conceived in 1979 as a means of creating a common weapons and 
sensors platform intended to replace aging units in eight NATO navies: Britain, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United States. In 1983 a common 
set of requirements was developed, and the following year the company Internationale 
Schiffs–Studien–Gesellschaft (ISS) was established in Hamburg to carry out feasibility 
designs. Spain began as a decidedly junior partner during the three-year feasibility/definition 
phase, in both the figurative and literal sense: a large number of young engineers from 
Bazán and the Spanish Navy cut their teeth on this program, working side-by-side with 
experienced naval architects, marine engineers, and combat systems engineers from other 
nations on early-stage concepts, trade-off studies, systems engineering, and systems 
integration activities: all critical aspects of the process to create a feasible design concept 
from user needs. The Spanish team quickly rose from being junior partner to leader; in 
1989, a senior Bazán engineer was appointed to head the second phase of the design 
effort; but several months later, the program abruptly ended as one nation after another 
pulled out (Schütz, 1990; “Un Ingeniero de Bazán,” 1989). 
The abrupt cancellation of NFR90 led various nations to collaborate on new frigate 
designs. Spain briefly collaborated with Germany and the Netherlands on a derivative 
design, but Spain soon pulled out in favor of creating a completely indigenous design. By 
now, the experience of NFR90, as well as the establishment of a solid Research and 
Development (R&D) base (e.g., the creation of the Bazán 80/82 series of hull forms in 
collaboration with El Pardo ship model basin), had given the government-owned shipyard 
the technical confidence to conceive, design, and build highly-complex naval ships without 
external assistance. The Plan Altamar, conceived at the end of the Cold War from 1989–
1990, called for a number of large, capable vessels to form a self-sufficient combat group to 
carry out operations at large distances and over extended periods—a distinct break from 
Spain’s previous role as a specialized cog in the overall NATO fleet. The first vessels 
conceived were six F100 air-defense frigates, the progeny of the NFR90 program, based 
upon the U.S. Aegis destroyer DDG 51 and built to strict military standards for shock, 
survivability, and so forth. Although the combat systems came from Lockheed Martin, the 
ships design and integration was performed entirely by Bazán. The first vessel, F101 Alvaro 
de Bazán, was ordered in 1997, laid down in 2000, and delivered in 2002. 
The next vessels in the Plan Altamar were logistics/replenishment vessels, required 
to sustain the combat group while forward deployed, and amphibious landing ships, which 
carry troops and equipment for deployment ashore. Spain (Bazán) collaborated with the 
Netherlands (Nevesbu, the design agency) from 1991–1994 to develop both types of ships. 
The jointly-developed replenishment vessels became the Amsterdam and Patiño classes, 
both delivered in 1995. In 1998 both navies delivered their amphibious landing vessels, 
Rotterdam and Galicia. Spain was a co-equal in the engineering of both ship classes, a 
remarkable leap of capability given that they were junior partners in the R-11, F80, and 
NFR90 programs just a decade earlier. Minehunters and submarines rounded out the plan’s 
capabilities. Since that time, a completely new vessel, the Buque de Proyección Estratégica 
(equivalent to an LHD) L61 Juan Carlos I has been launched. At 28,000 tonnes and €360 
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million ($500 million), it is the largest and most expensive vessel in the Spanish Navy 
(Armada Española, 2011; Campbell-Cruz, 1997; Lok, 1989). 
The accumulated experience of designing and building complex warships, both in 
cooperation with other nations as well as autonomously, quickly led Bazán to enter the 
export market. Its first major export contract was obtained in 1992 for the construction of the 
VSTOL aircraft carrier Chakri Naruebet for the Royal Thai Navy. This was a major 
accomplishment for the Spanish industry, coming as it did on the heels of the Thai Navy’s 
cancellation of a project with the German shipyard Bremer Vulcan, long a major force in the 
naval warship export market, and winning ahead of competing bids from French and Italian 
shipbuilders. Bazán based its design on the recently delivered Principe de Asturias, with 
major modifications to the propulsion, aviation, and combat systems, but squeezed into a 
hull 2/3 the size. The vessel was delivered in 1997, just three years after keel-laying. From 
start to finish, this was a completely indigenous effort, and marked Spain’s entry as a major 
player in the world naval export market (Saunders, 2007, p. 773; Saylor, 2009). 
One of the reasons for Bazán’s strong showing was its steady improvement in 
design and construction methods during the 1990s. Much of this was home-grown, although 
there was some interaction with the Spain’s state-owned merchant-shipbuilding enterprise, 
Astilleros Espanoles S.A. (AESA), which also had shown steady improvements in 
productivity in the face of overcapacity and increased competition (Cerezo & Sánchez-
Jaúregui, 1995; Houpt & Ortiz-Villajos,1988). In December 2000 the Spanish government 
sought to improve the overall competitiveness of the shipbuilding enterprise by merging 
Bazán and AESA into a single company, Izar, having both military and commercial 
capabilities. Interestingly, with the emergence of high-level requirements in commercial 
vessels for noise reduction, high speed, and integration of complex systems, there was as 
much flow of technical knowledge from the military to the commercial sectors as in the other 
direction (Ferreiro, 2004). That merger was annulled soon after, when the European 
Commission found it to be in breach of regulations; in 2005 Izar spun off the military yards in 
El Ferrol, Cádiz, and Cartagena to form the new company Navantia. 
The ability to mix commercial and military shipbuilding practices was a strong factor 
in Norway’s selection of Bazán (soon to be Izar) over other competitors, including the 
German shipbuilder Blohm und Voss and a consortium of Norwegian shipbuilders, to build 
five Aegis frigates. The F310 Fridtjof Nansen class is based on the F100 design, even 
though at the time the first Spanish ship was not yet in commission, but with hull and 
machinery systems to a mix of commercial and military standards. Izar laid the keel of the 
first vessel in 2003 and delivered it in 2006, with more frigates following every year until 
2011. This rapid pace was maintained even while the shipyard was constructing F100s; in 
other words, the shipyard effectively managed the side-by-side construction of two classes 
of ships, one built to mixed commercial/military standards and the other to purely military 
standards, with little or no difficulty in configuration control (Ferreiro, 2004; Saunders, 2007, 
p. 544). 
Navantia’s clean sweep of the global competition to rebuild Australia’s navy, 
mentioned at the beginning of this paper, had its roots starting in 2003, during the lead-up to 
Australia’s 10-year Defence Capability Plan (DCP) 2006–2016. The Navy was in the 
process of revitalizing its shipbuilding and sustainment capabilities, having recently 
completed (with New Zealand) the construction of 10 ANZAC under license from Blohm und 
Voss. Under the new DCP, the Australian Navy would further expand its indigenous 
shipbuilding capabilities to include the management, integration and sustainment of highly 
complex warships, viz. three Air Warfare Destroyers (AWDs) and a pair of LHD-type 
amphibious ships (Markowski et al., 2008). 
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In fact, Australia was going through the exact situation Spain had found itself in 
during the 1980s when it was still building frigates under license, although at the time these 
parallels were not always obvious. In fact, the early round of bidding for the AWDs seemed 
to favor Blohm und Voss over their rivals Navantia and Gibbs & Cox Inc. Blohm und Voss, 
apart from its success with ANZAC, was by far the leading warship exporter in the world, 
with over 50 ships built or licensed around the world. In 2005, however, the Defence 
Minister announced that Gibbs & Cox Inc., with their modified DDG 51 concept, was the 
“preferred designer,” even though the competition was still open (“American Firm Chosen,” 
2005). At the same time, the competition for the amphibious ship program was heating up 
between the French naval shipbuilder ARMARIS and its proposal based on the recently 
commissioned Mistral class, and Navantia’s proposal based on Juan Carlos I, which was not 
even launched. However, on June 21, 2007, the Royal Australian Navy selected both of 
Navantia’s proposals, which involved the shipbuilder teaming with the local defense industry 
leader Tenix; the AWD Hobart class would be built entirely in Australia, while the LHD 
Canberra class would be primarily constructed at El Ferrol, but integrated in Australia 
(Davies, 2007; Uhlmann, 2007). 
It is not too great a leap to state that Gibbs & Cox Inc. had been the mentor to 
Navantia/Bazán, guiding them through the arduous process of ship design and construction; 
now, in perhaps a poignant moment, that student had become a master and a mentor to 
others. The two firms, however, maintain an excellent relationship. Navantia today continues 
to look further afield for export opportunities, building on its relationship with Norway to 
provide replenishment ships that will keep its frigates forward-deployed, and is also looking 
to reequip a resurgent Indian Navy with modern destroyers (“La Armada Noruega,” 2009; 
Raghuvanshi, 2009). 
Evolution of Technology Transfer in Chilean Naval Shipbuilding, 1960–2010 
The history of Chile’s naval shipbuilding industry is both shorter and narrower than 
that of Spain, but it represents a snapshot of a similar but accelerated pattern of an industry 
advancing towards national autonomy while simultaneously becoming a global force in the 
naval export market. Since its inception, the Chilean navy has been almost entirely 
composed of foreign-built and secondhand vessels. Indeed, during Chile’s war for 
independence from Spain in 1817, its first naval commander-in-chief was former British 
naval officer Thomas Cochrane, who fought aboard the Russian-built frigate O’Higgins 
which had been captured from Spain. Its ties with Britain remained strong throughout the 
19th century; most of its ships, including the famous vessels Esmeralda and Blanco 
Encalada, were built in Britain, and many of its officers, engineers and sailors were British-
born. This pattern continued through the first half of the 20th century, with Chilean officers 
visiting British industries and attending its universities, and vessels such as the battleship 
Almirante Latorre being built in its shipyards (Corbalan, 1994; Roth, 2009; Scheina, 1987; 
Urrutia, 2008). 
The United States saw a brief rise in influence across Latin America after World War 
II. It established naval missions throughout the region, and in 1947 led a coalition of nations 
to sign the Rio Treaty which established a common defense framework for the Western 
hemisphere. As part of this framework, the USA sold or leased warships at low cost to 
several nations including Chile, for example, the ex-Brooklyn class cruisers O’Higgins and 
Prat, as well as gradually replacing many British-built destroyers with U.S. ones. These 
transfers came at a price; under the U.S.-led strategy, the Chilean and other Latin American 
navies were assigned the ASW mission against potential Soviet forces. This was not a 
mission for which the Latin navies were either prepared or particularly enthusiastic. Through 
most of the Cold War, Chile and its neighbors participated in joint ASW exercises such as 
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UNITAS, but their ships and equipment became increasingly outdated as the U.S. restricted 
the transfer of more modern equipment. Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, coupled with 
U.S. sanctions against Chile during the Allende and Pinochet regimes and the general 
friction that ensued after the Falklands (Malvinas) War, greatly reduced the U.S. influence in 
the region. Although the situation improved markedly after the end of the Cold War, the 
Chilean navy longer depended on one or two allies to supply its ships and equipment; in its 
recent naval buildup, Chile has acquired modern warships from Britain, France, Israel, 
Netherlands, and the United States, in support of its modern naval strategy that has de-
emphasized ASW in favor of a “three vector” strategy: the defense of maritime sovereignty, 
enforcement of maritime laws, and participation in international operations (Revista Vigia, 
2008). 
In fact, Chile had long been moving, albeit quite slowly, to develop an indigenous 
capability to repair, modernize, and eventually rebuild its own fleet. Chile’s extensive Pacific 
shoreline, and its position at the entrance of the Magellan Straits, made it a natural site for 
shipyards, which have existed in Valparaiso, Valdivia, Talcahuano, and Punta Arenas since 
the early 1800s. Originally, naval shipyard activity was almost entirely devoted to the repair 
and maintenance of Chile’s foreign-built warships. With assistance from Britain, Germany, 
and France, these facilities were gradually modernized with the installation of fixed and 
floating drydocks (the first of which opened in 1896), heavy cranes, and workshops, 
although these improvements did not keep pace with the increasing technical complexity of 
the warships they serviced. Unlike the Spanish paradigm, the naval shipyards were never 
operated directly by foreign-owned companies. 
By 1953 the Chilean navy was looking for a way to breathe new life into its 
increasingly moribund naval industrial sector, and entertained numerous proposals from 
abroad to update its facilities. After much internal debate, in 1960 the government created 
the state-owned enterprise Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada (ASMAR), incorporating 
the naval shipyards at Talcahuano, Valparaiso, and Punta Arenas. Although the shipyard’s 
principal mission was to service the vessels of the Chilean navy, it actively sought other 
business opportunities in the repair and modernization of other navies (e.g., Ecuador and 
Peru) as well as the construction and repair of fishing vessels and other commercial vessels, 
which helped maintain employment and augment shipyard skill levels. In the early 1970s the 
government once again invited proposals from around the world to modernize ASMAR’s 
facilities, but the fiscal crisis of 1973 and subsequent military coup put the brakes on this 
project. Within a few years, however, the country began a program of investing 10% of sales 
from the state copper company CODELCO into the military, divided equally between the 
three services. As the naval budget began to rise, so too did investment in ASMAR’s 
facilities and expertise in modern naval systems, as the shipyard performed ever-more-
complex overhaul and modernization tasks such as the conversion of two ex-British missile 
cruisers into light helicopter carriers (Fritz, 2005; Roman, 2009). 
In 1977 ASMAR began its foray into constructing complex military-type ships, initially 
for the Chilean navy. The first vessels, three Maipo amphibious (LST) vessels, were built to 
the plans of the French DCN-designed Batral, and delivered from 1982 to 1985. This was 
followed by a Canadian-designed cargo/troopship Aquiles, delivered in 1988. In 2004 
ASMAR teamed with the German shipyard Fassmer to create an offshore patrol vessel 
(OPV) program of up to four ships that would provide sea and airborne capabilities for all 
three maritime vectors. The Piloto Pardo class was designed by Fassmer based on previous 
patrol vessels, but enlarged and possessing greater military capability to meet Chile’s 
needs. The German yard provided design and engineering support, but the entire 
fabrication, construction, and systems integration of this complex vessel was carried out by 
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ASMAR engineers. Two ships have already been delivered, with another two projected for 
the future. The same design is being used by Chile’s neighbors, Argentina and Colombia, 
for their naval patrol programs (Swinford, 2008; Quezada, 2008). 
At the end of the Cold War, with the naval export market beginning to increase and 
broaden, ASMAR took the step of constructing military-type vessels for other nations. In 
1992 it teamed with the Western Canada Marine Group (WCMG) to offer an OPV to the 
Mauritius Coast Guard, which beat out competition from ten other shipyards. Using plans 
developed by Polar Design Associates of Canada, ASMAR worked under the supervision of 
WCMG to build the stealthy vessel (i.e., lower radar cross-section, acoustic silencing), which 
required a high quality of workmanship to meet the operational specifications. In 1998 
ASMAR competed against 13 other shipyards worldwide to build the Icelandic 
oceanographic research vessel Arni Fridriksson, using plans developed by an Icelandic 
design firm. Once again ASMAR had to perform high-quality, complex work due to the 
exacting acoustic silencing requirements similar to those of a naval vessel. This successful 
project led ASMAR in 2006 to bid for another Iceland project, a 4,000 tonne OPV for the 
Icelandic Coast Guard to be built under license from STX Canada Marine (whose parent 
company had by now bought up several of ASMAR’s former partners, including WCMG and 
Rolls Royce-Ulstein, which had originally provided the design for the OPV, similar to the 
Norwegian Coast Guard’s Harstad). ASMAR won the bid in 2009 and constructed the ICGV 
Thor at the Talcahuano shipyard, which despite enormous damage from the 2010 
earthquake and tsunami, was delivered to the Icelandic Coast Guard in 2011 
(“Canadian/Chilean Bid,” 1996; Fritz, 2005, pp. 187–197; Icelandic Coast Guard, 2011). 
In summary, the Chilean naval shipbuilding capability embodied in the state-owned 
company ASMAR is now at approximately the same stage (but at a smaller scale) as its 
Spanish homologue Navantia was during the 1980s: via a series of international 
partnerships providing shipbuilding technology transfer, it has developed the autonomous 
capability to build complex warships for both indigenous use as well as for export. For the 
time being, AMAR intends to continue maintaining and modernizing its foreign-built fleet, 
and partnering with other designers to create new coastal and offshore patrol vessels (Vega, 
2008). It remains to be seen if and how ASMAR will develop and maintain a capability 
(including access to a solid R&D base) for the early-stage conception, design, and 
integration of complex military vessels for the Chilean navy as well as for export abroad, 
which would give the nation full autonomy for its warship building industry. 
Conclusions and Lessons for Naval Shipbuilders 
The experiences of Navantia and ASMAR show how a modern naval shipbuilder can 
rapidly evolve from a net importer of technology to a net exporter, with the assistance of 
foreign technology transfer. Beginning with the Navy’s direct purchase of foreign warships, 
the shipyard can develop familiarity with complex naval systems to build up its engineering 
expertise; next, it can accumulate design and build expertise with the construction of vessels 
under a license or government agreement from a foreign shipyard; and finally, participating 
with partner yards in early-stage conception, design, and integration process in order to 
have a complete end-to-end warship building capability. This process is little changed from 
when the United States and Japan rapidly evolved their own naval capabilities at the 
beginning of the 20th century. The difference between then and now is that the naval 
warship export market, which has opened considerably since the end of the Cold War, has 
greatly improved the potential for both business partners as well as customers, which helps 
build the business case for these investments. Once again, as the examples of the Spanish 
and Chilean shipyards have shown, it is possible to rapidly take a leading position in that 
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market while still partnering with other yards for design support (as shown by ASMAR), or 
having a fully fledged conceive–design–build capability (Navantia). 
The recent experience of a U.S. shipbuilder shows how such international 
technology transfer may improve its market position. In January 2009 the Italian state-
owned shipbuilder Fincantieri acquired Marinette Marine, a Wisconsin-based private 
shipyard currently building the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The Italian yard is bringing to 
Marinette its experience, know-how, and capital equipment to increase shipbuilding 
automation, streamline production processes, and rationalize its build and launch 
techniques, with the goal of decreasing shipbuilding costs by one-fifth. As of February 2012, 
the labor-hours required to construct an LCS have decreased 30% (Kington, 2009; Phelps, 
2012). One of the long-term goals is to offer the LCS for export, an ambition which has been 
thwarted in the past due to large program cost overruns. 
¿Que inventen ellos? In the case of naval shipbuilding, it is often true that others 
(i.e., foreigners) have already invented it. The experience of Navantia and ASMAR have 
shown that it matters less who invents it, but rather how others can adapt it to become their 
own. It is by following this process that Spain and Chile have so quickly become 
shipbuilders to the world. 
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